NATIONAL SERVICE & THE RIGHT TO VOTE Speech at Workers’ Party Youth Wing YouthQuake Forum: “Should Singaporean Youths be Allowed to Vote at 18?” 3rd May 2008 Having served for a little more than over a year since March 2006, my term in national service has been marked with its own moments of glories and downfalls - there were the highs, instances where all efforts seem to have come to fruition, all the fatigue, sadness and tears redeemed and the success rendering all sacrifices worthwhile; and there were the inevitable occasions where you were at the very nadir, when self-defeatism rears its head and existentialist questions comes into play - and you begin questioning why you are even there, why you even bother to serve. But it is no different from what other men would describe; the quintessential NS experience: bittersweet, but no less a meaningful sacrifice. And the state recognizes this sacrifice - we are bestowed with numerous perks and benefits, made available through the good offices of their statutory boards and quasi-governmental agencies. We enjoy movie concessions on weekends, discounts at selected retail outlets and restaurants and access to sports and recreational facilities courtesy of SAFRA, while concession prices are offered for theatre tickets, and we can get a waiver for our mobile phone subscriptions. However, these consolation benefits make our greatest right ever more elusive - the recognition of our service to the nation, of our sacrifice of two years of prime youth does not extend to the right to vote. And this is where the inconsistency lies: despite fulfilling the dues of citizenship and carrying out our national duty as prescribed by our Singaporean citizenship, we do not get accorded the full rights of citizenship. And this is akin to taxation without representation - the rallying call of the Americans against the imposition of taxes by the British colonial power. A Boston politician, James Otis, went so far as to declare that “taxation without representation is tyranny.” And it is an act of tyranny that we are excluded suffrage despite contributing to the upkeep of the nation. I believe that it should be an inherent principle of democracy to extend suffrage to those who are serving the interests of the nation, particularly for those who provide for the finances and the defence of the state. The finance and defence of the state are the two important pillars by which the state derives its power and exercise its sovereignty from; and in defence lies the central and critical factor to the state’s existence since it serves as a guarantee and protection of its sovereign right. It goes without saying that without a viable military capability or an effective defence capacity, the state would find it vulnerable to encroachments to its territorial and sovereign integrity. The arrangement of National Service therefore accords a huge and heavy responsibility to the serving conscripts, as it provides the right to bear arms and be the guardians of the land - a duty never trivial. This suggests that the government has an implicit trust in the NSFs (Full-time National Servicemen) to undertake such a critical responsibility; however a similar trust to enfranchise us into the electorate remains lacking. The right of eighteen years old to vote was gained dearly in the United States, when eighteen year-olds were drafted to serve and fight for the American stand against communism in Indochina. The Vietnam War exacted a substantial casualty toll - and it mostly constituted of teenagers without a voice in the political process and therefore had no access to the authority that deployed them into the warzone. The push for reduction therefore rested on the campaign premise that if you are “old enough to fight, [you are] old enough to vote.” In 1971, the 26th Amendment lowered the voting age to 18 at the federal level, with states rapidly following suit for local elections - making it one of the quickest ratifications in history. The American public recognized and endeavoured to reconcile the fact that these 18 years old were being conscripted yet were deprived of a voice in the democratic process of the country; despite dying for the nation’s cause, they were still disenfranchised. The recognition of their service and sacrifice in the form of medals, commendations and financial compensations were deemed hollow, as they were not endowed with the full rights of citizenship despite being true patriots prepared to sacrifice their lives. It was an anomaly, and one that was quickly rectified, that the most courageous and boldest citizens had no representation in politics, in spite of being the most deserving to have a voice. While it is true that an outbreak of war in Singapore (and servicemen dying to protect the nation) is unlikely, it misses the point as the central tenet to the reduction campaign was that those serving in the military should have the right to choose the political authority that wields the power to deploy them. It reiterates the state’s accountability to its tools of state, one of which is the armed forces. The soldiers should be able to question, and the government answer for, the state and condition of the military and its personnel, and enfranchising those serving would provide them with a voice to air their concerns and grievances. And when we examine two nations with an active conscription policy, it would bolster the argument to draw down the voting age. In Finland and Israel, the culture of national service is deeply entrenched - and it is the latter from which we drew inspiration to develop our own National Service model. And these two countries have a voting age of 18. In Israel, it would be difficult to justify excluding the men and women who serves three-year terms and are deployed in warzones and hostile areas like the West Bank and Gaza, where there is a real and active threat of fatality involved. It would provoke moral outrage, and seem outrightly reprehensible, if the State of Israel were to deny representation to those who are thrown into the midst of battle and are ready to undertake the ultimate sacrifice for the country. Again, there is little scope for applicability to the Singapore context, since the casualties that we sustain is not through wars or battles, but only through training accidents. And this is obviously not sufficient enough to compel the authorities to recognize the sacrifice that we undertake; and it remains that our commitment to defend Singapore “with our lives” - inscribed in the pledge we undertake on the first day of enlistment - does not compel for an equal commensuration of political rights. In Finland, there has been a history of reduction in voting age from 24 to 18 - and it is considered one of the most progressive democracies in the world, being the first nation to introduce women suffrage. Its conscription model bears close resemblance to Singapore, with mandatory service in either in the military or civilian branch, with the option of armed or unarmed vocations for the former. The duration of service varies accordingly to the training, vocation and rank - those in technical, specialized vocations, or holding command and leadership roles such as commissioned and non-commissioned officers will be liable for a longer service term - an arrangement that almost parallels the Singapore system. And the Finnish model has a corresponding political arrangement that bestows voting rights to eighteen years old; a change effectuated in 1972, which, along with other objectives such as increasing voter turnout, was an effort to enfranchise those serving in the military. The change was a gesture of recognition and credit of thanks for the services these conscripts rendered to the country - and the central principle governing this arrangement was that if a citizen fulfills the necessary obligations and renders service to the country as stipulated under the dues of his citizenship, there should be a corresponding commitment by the state to endow the full rights of citizenship that can be enjoyed, in particular the right to vote. And these two countries are not alone in their stand to accord serving conscripts a vote; countries such as Germany, Greece, Russia, Norway and Turkey have similar conscription and voting arrangements. Interestingly in Turkey, the right to vote is accorded at 18 even though conscription begins at 20 - the right to vote is granted in anticipation of the conscript’s future service, even though he was not at the moment fulfilling that due. Despite international precedents and the moral and political right that powers the argument for the reduction in voting age, there will still be concerns about maturity of these eighteen years old. However, if these eighteen years old conscripts were to be considered immature to grasp the intricacies of the political process, then the implementation of National Service would constitute as an irresponsible act since it would be akin to providing a child with a loaded gun. The right to bear arms, as previously stated, is a responsibility, a heavy duty, that should not be trivialized or trifled with - and if the state believes that these eighteen years old could undertake such a duty, then it consistently follows that he is of sufficient sound mind to make an informed decision. This discrepancy represents an inconsistent practice that has to be resolved, because it weakens the value of democracy and political ownership in Singapore. As it stands, there is a selective allocation of duties of state without a commensurate political compensation - it would be no less than exploitation to have conscripts undertake responsibility for burdens of the state but to deprive them of the perks and rewards. The situation is a one-sided social contract that unfairly penalizes the serving conscripts, and there is no moral justification to perpetuate the practice. Also, for maturity to be considered as a prerequisite for the right to vote remains tenuous, as it would potentially disqualify a substantial portion of the electorate since age is not necessarily a convenient barometer of maturity. There are many middle-aged men and the elderly who do not make informed decisions when they vote, but yet they are not disqualified from voting. To say that every citizen at and after the age of 21 is mature is dubious, and it demeans the argument that the right to vote should be coupled with maturity. The right to vote should essentially be accorded to recognize the contributions of citizens and provide them with a legitimate mean of voicing their concerns; and in the context of national service, the right to vote recognizes the services of the conscripts in providing for the perpetuated existence of the nation through defence. It has to be remembered that a citizenship both discharges obligations and grants rights, and the government must allow individuals to exercise both - that is, to carry out their obligations and also enjoy the rights. The incongruity of serving NS but not having a vote means that the conscript only has the former, and that is an unfair arrangement that requires redress. Also, there will be a concern that providing NSFs the right to vote would bring politics into the barracks and camps; there is a worry that there will be a politicization of the military. The fear is that the army will be wreaked along divisive partisan lines, and it will cease to function. There is no discernable logic in this - as there is a very real distinction between the military as an institution, and the military in terms of its personnel. The military as an institution can, and should and must, remain neutral to affairs related to the civilian and political realm, but that is not achieved by depriving its personnel the right to vote. The right to vote empowers servicemen with a voice in the political process in their personal capacity, as an individual citizen. They do not vote as representatives of the military, but as private citizens with their own share of concerns and aspirations. To deprive voting rights on the grounds that one is a military personnel is quite hard to justify (particularly since they are serving the nation), and that logic would entail regulars should be disbarred from voting as well, an arrangement which would undoubtedly be of much displeasure to them. Also, political participation would transform the NS experience into a more meaningful one - as it contrives to provide a sense of ownership to the conscript. Many would attest to becoming cynical, jaded and detached after serving for two years, and while the right to vote would not cure this malaise, it would go some way in ameliorating the low morale pervasive in the institution. The right to vote would adduce further motivation for the conscript to discharge his responsibilities to the best of his abilities, as a direct link has been forged between the citizen-soldier and the nation; there is an intertwining of fates: the soldier recognizes that his success is the nation’s success, and the nation’s success his. This sense of ownership and empowerment in the country’s affair is greatly lacking, and contributes to the poor appreciation of national service by the citizens of this country. The right to vote would, in its own little way, do much to transform the fundamental perspective to national service. THE GRC SLATE: DYNAMICS & APPEAL The Workers’ Party has thrown the gauntlet: a GRC victory in the subsequent hustings slated for 2011 - and with Sec-Gen Low Thia Kang not ruling out his candidature in a GRC slate, the prospect of another tantalizing electoral battle superseding the legendary clashes of Eunos (1991), Cheng San (1997) and Aljunied (2006) would not seem far-fetched. First proposed and implemented in the 1988 elections as a necessary mechanism to ensure racial minority representation in a triumvirate fashion, the GRC system has since expanded further to incorporate super GRCs composing of four to six members - a development which not only has diluted its original intent of providing minority representation, but also disposes a strategic advantage to the PAP by allowing them to deploy candidates of ministerial stature to helm their GRC slate and thereby boosting the electoral chances of new candidates. (Tellingly, in an 2006 interview, Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong revealed that the GRC was a means to attract new PAP candidates into entering politics with a sense of security, who would otherwise be ambivalent about giving up their lucrative private careers only to slog in the roughshot environment of electoral skirmishes without any guarantee of success.) Nonwithstanding the still-controversial arrangement of the GRC and allegations of gerrymandering, it has become an accepted feature of local politics, however bregudgingly - as the Opposition begins to see worth in gunning for what was once six safe seats for the ruling party as six potential seats to be gained in one single swoop. The ante is definitely rising, as the PAP’s apparent impregnability would be devastatingly diminished in the event that it loses a GRC - such would be the psychological consequence of a GRC changing hands. Amidst the hope for such a watershed event, it is statistically worth noting that the Opposition has been faring marginally worse with each subsequent election in battleground GRCs. The closest Workers’ Party team had ever come to clinch a four-member GRC was in Eunos of 1991, where the margin of victory was a narrow 4160 votes out of an electoral tally of 89,395. Cheng San 1997 was lost by a margin of 9.6%, while the recent Aljunied team recorded a loss by 12.2% of the votes. While it goes without saying that all three recorded their fair share of controversy, flamboyant personalities and titanic clashes, it remains that the Opposition is lagging behind in its effort to capture a much-vaunted GRC. The 2007 Aljunied team, which was considered one of the most balanced and formidable slate of Opposition candidates to contest, comprised of: Sylvia Lim, a law lecturer; Tan Wui Hua, a financial controller; James Gomez, a researcher/academic; Goh Meng Seng, a businessman; and Mohammad Rahizan, who also pursues his own business. The dubbed A Team, their age was in the 40s range with Goh Meng Seng a young political entrant at 36 and a 49 years old Rahizan, a veteran of elections and a former stalwart of the now-flagging PKMS. The mixture of youthful professionals, a man bestowed with experience and another allowing easy identification to heartland voters held much promise, particularly aided by the Chinese crowd-pulling power of Low Thia Kang - however, the first GRC victory proved elusive, and that has been attributed to the dissonance between the Workers’ Party and the Malay electorate. Much has been placed into this development, particularly since the Malays were never seen as a traditional bastion of the PAP support base; hence, it could be concluded that among the reasons for the defeat (of which many can be conjectured and proven valid), the lack of Malay candidates with substantial pulling power in the Opposition rank has proven to be a detriment. Therefore, with a hypothetical Aljunied rematch in mind, a redoubtle Workers’ Party slate would inevitably have to include certain elements that could capture the cross-section of the electorate to provide for the necessary margin of victory. The dream team would compose of a respected veteran Opposition figure, by which Low Thia Kang would amply fulfill the role - and also serving as the Chinese helicopter in local parlance, attracting the masses of Chinese heartland voters; and complemented by two youthful professionals who would spearhead efforts to represent the aspirations of the younger generation; a mature and experienced executive in the mould of Sylvia Lim whose stable mid-career would be the beacon to encourage greater political fortitude in that particularly age group who would usually have pursued the safe option of a PAP vote; a senior citizen whose empathy could relate to the rapidly ageing voting populace and lastly, an undergratuate (or recently graduated) student which would anchor the newly-enfranchised voters who had recently attained majority. And to specificially address the Malay voting issue, the senior citizen figure could double as a pious Muslim aware of the various religious and racial concerns of the Malay community (particularly the older ones) and therefore making it a truly inclusive slate that stands a viable chance of capturing a substantial amount of voters from every cross-section of the electorate - although this particular trump card could prove a huge hazard if the electoral battle degenerate into another character assasination campaign with warnings of possible racial inflammation, as the experience of Jufrie Mohammad (Eunos, 1991) and Tang Liang Hong (Cheng San, 1997) would attest. Furthermore, in an effort to engage the minority communities even further, the inclusion of more than the prerequisite amount of minority candidates could help further even the odds, as the Workers’ Party could then hope to evolve its image beyond the slightly Chinese-centric overtones that it currently (with much regret and through no deliberate fault of its own) exudes. Also, besides ploughing into the murky realm of non-resolved and hanging Malay concerns (the issues of social mobility, the discrimination in the SAF and alleged instances in employments opportunities, the continued existence of madrasahs among others), a GRC team aspirant could also delve deep into the fabric of the Indian community, a minorty race that has been largely eclipsed in attention to their numerically-superior Malay counterparts. Underpinning these very generic outlines of a GRC slate par excellence, the Workers’ Party has much to do to secure its progress: chiefly, initiating efforts to ensure its wherewithal to attract the prerequisite Malay candidates - from the range of young professionals to experienced retirees with good grounding in religious issues, and assembling fact-finding teams to cull on-the-ground sentiments of the minority communities to provide the impression that their concerns are being taken seriously and that concrete proposals will be developed to assuage these concerns. As much as an ethnocentric approach to electoral battles could prove to counterproductive to the ideal vision of a Singapore identified by citizenship rather than race, it is quite hard to fathom how that could be viably achieved without first addressing the outstanding concerns of the racial minority groups whose resentment at its perceived marginalization, whatever the justification, remains real. THE VALUE OF INCONGRUITY The nation-building media cranks up, and spews forth another report on the state of crime in Singapore. Wednesday January 24, 8:17 PM Crime in Singapore fell 10 percent in 2006: police SINGAPORE : Singapore, one of Asia’s safest cities, said Wednesday crime fell by 10 percent in 2006 from the previous year. There were 33,393 cases recorded last year, down from 37,093 in 2005, police said. The total number of persons arrested fell 12 percent to 19,273 of which 14 percent were foreigners. Theft and related offences accounted for 61 percent of the cases. Mobile phone theft declined about five percent from 4825 to 4594 due in part to a police initiative allowing the public and handphone resellers to screen for stolen phones. The police are now looking at how to make the database more easily available to the public via SMS. They are studying the cost and technical specifications of such a system and hope to roll it out soon. “We are looking at how we can use the SMS so that the member of the public can send an SMS into the system and the system can then inform the member of public whether the particular hand-phone is a stolen item or not,” said Tan Puay Kern, Director, Special Duties and Public Affairs. New initiatives like identifying youths at risk and informing their parents of their activities have yielded positive results. This year, the police also hope to focus their attention on crime against the elderly. It was noted that while robberies in general saw a drop from 1,092 to 946 cases, those targeting older people went up from 51 to 63. Also up was theft of metal, which saw a doubling in the number of cases last year from 526 to 1092, with reports of cables, signages, drain covers, raw materials and even prayer urns being stolen. The police said they will be working with property owners as well as town councils and the public to be more vigilant and to take better security measures. In a nation of four million people, there were 17 murder cases, down from 21 the previous year. All the cases have been solved, police said. The island-nation has taken an uncompromising stand against crime, making it one of Asia’s safest and cleanest cities and a favoured destination for foreign investments. Reuters though had a different impression in mind: Wed Jan 24, 5:00 AM ET Singapore’s crime-free image goes down the drain SINGAPORE (Reuters) - It is considered one of Asia’s safest cities, but authorities in Singapore have a theft problem — spurred by a surge in metals prices. Thefts of drain covers, prayer urns, copper cables and other metal items doubled in Singapore last year, the police said on Wednesday. While the overall crime rate in Singapore dropped 10 percent last year, metal-related thefts jumped, with 1,092 cases in 2006 compared with 566 cases in the previous year. “Most of the stolen metal items are sold to Karung Guni men,” said Tan Puay Kern, the senior assistant commissioner of police, referring to Singapore’s rag-and-bone men. He added that thieves had made off with lightning conductors, street signs, and the housings for cable-television equipment. Last year, Singapore was voted by Asian expatriates as the best place to live out of 257 locations worldwide because of its clean air, infrastructure and low crime rate, according to a survey by ECA International, a human resource consultancy for multinationals. The price of metals such as copper has doubled in the last two years, amid speculative buying by investors who bet on tight supply and rising demand as emerging market economies increase spending on infrastructure. It would have been all too easy to lambast Channelnewsasia for the former report, and fairly allege that it attempts to obfuscate any notion of negativity that may have been present - which contributes nothing new. Media will always exist in varying degrees of biases and inclinations, whether blatant or subtle, and exhorting them to become objective and responsible is comically anachronistic. What Truth (whatever that abstract entity is) needs isn’t a fair coverage in the papers, but rather discerning readers able to identify the shortcomings in the various coverage and reportings available - it is not enough (or practical) to launch potshots at the state media for its flawed coverage, it has been happening far too long and will happen for another far too long period. However, the accessibility of the internet and the ascedancy of the mainstream media provides an opportunity to develop the mind of a reader able to discriminate between news agencies and blogs, to read everything with a strong pinch of salt and to formulate his own conclusions and impressions - the way forward is not to initiate barrages of attack against state media and private news corporation with ulterior agendas, rather it is to nurture an empowered reader that can adequately leverage on various sources of information to reach his own judgment, a discerning citizen who can negotiate with the litany of reporting and is not held hostage by the orientation of his reading material but can think through on his own accord. All bluster and fancy, the real challenge lies in developing these very discerning readers. It will be tedious, there will be the intrinsic reluctance in people to leave their comfort zones - but persistence and faith should carry through. It is incredulous to believe that the entire 66.6% of the population of Singapore is addled with a hardcore faith in the government and their news outlet, what keeps them mostly in the PAP’s bastion is the imposing notion of broaching out beyond the established and mainstream. The solution would then be to engage them, rather than vilify and condescend their support for the ruling party. The behaviour of opposition supporters - that is, to decry and denouce PAP supporters as sheeps, among others - only serves to alienate any potential voter who may have his reservations about the incumbent government and creates a wider gulf between opposition parties and the mainstream voters. The zealousness of opposition supporters could be more effectively harnessed to engage and interact with PAP voters, in an effort to bring them away from the government’s rhetorics and into the opposition’s folds. * That said, the SDP has called for a hunger strike to ‘register their outrage’ at the impending hanging of Tochi, in a concerted effort with an European Member of Parliament Marco Panella in Italy. While it is heartening to note their gesture of disapproval, it is hard to see how this would be effective beyond the consequent media frenzy as a result of another stand-off with the police - given that hardly any attention will be paid to their cause (Tochi), but on their action of protest. Again, it is not to fault their intentions, but a hunger strike is a course of action far discredited in Singapore - particularly since none of the strikers were in any mortal danger and the fast is merely symbolic. While there are different severities of hunger strikes, the one intended for tomorrow, as the author understands for a source, entails an SDP-styled fast from solid food while allowing the consumption of fluids. While no less a noble gesture, its efficacy must be seriously doubted and the practitioners of civil disobedience may find a populace cynical of another symbolic fast, which plays directly to the PAP’s line that these are merely inconsequential antics. Civil disobedience is about persistence, but not unoriginality. Another quasi-hunger strike, another discredited notion, another plan of potential marred by haphazard execution. NSP BREAKAWAY: THE WAY FORWARD About time - after the persistent bouts of rumours milling around, the National Solidarity Party strikes out on its own, and leaving the Singapore Democratic Alliance whittling down to three component parties: the Singapore People’s Party, led by stalwart Chiam See Tong, the Singapore Malay National Organization (Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura, or PKMS) and the Singapore Justice Party. As much as the split was presented amicably (with laudable praises being heaped upon Chiam) to preempt the state media from playing up the line of intra-opposition disunity, the undertones - and issues of contention - revealed a different picture. The grapevine has thrown up that the NSP was pushing for a full merger of the four party, instead of the current formal alliance, which Chiam was against due to the dominance that NSP would garner from the new arrangement. Also, the refrains that Chiam was ‘lethargic’ when it comes to leadership succession and renewal cannot be ignored, as the discontent spreads far and wide - the other (and former) SDA point-man, Steve Chia, did express his concern about the dire straits of renewal before taking his leave from politics post-election. Nevertheless, detractors are up against the wantaway NSP, pointing to its relative anonymity and lack of strong public personalities to anchor the party - although its quite hard to believe how staying within the SDA would have allowed them to develop its own individual reputation and prominent figures. While a number of people can recognize Steve Chia’s affiliation to SDA, whether the same number can identify that he was the former secretary-general of NSP is moot. Keeping in mind that the coalition structure not only restricted the NSP’s ability to bolster its own identity, but prevented them from playing a substantive role in the SDA itself (in lieu of the veto that Chiam apparently wields by virtue of SPP’s status as the leading party in the alliance), their request to amalgate into a single party was fair. The merger would have allowed them to acquire full ownership of the SDA on par with the other parties so they could proactively lead in the formative development of the new party, instead of being left in the quandary of punching in the shadows of an alliance which they have little say in despite being relatively dominant. The merger will undeniably come at the expense of Chiam’s power in SDA - and may potentially leave him at the mercy of an NSP-dominated CEC that, as an internet forummer phrased it, “holds his parliamentary seat hostage” - an unenviable throwback to his old days when his Potong Pasir seat did not compel the loyalty of the SDP CEC during the Chee Soon Juan’s hunger strike debacle, leading to an ignominous resignation from his post as secretary-general. That episode, the ramifications of which are still obvious today in Chiam’s reported reluctance to invest trust in new recruits, must have been etched clearly in his mind as he refused the merger proposal. Hence, it only makes sense for the NSP to defect from the SDA - since the latter does not provide much opportunity for the NSP to flourish and grow. For the chairman of SPP to state that “it will be much harder for NSP to succeed on its own” is pretty tenuous, since its becoming increasingly clear that SDA needs NSP more rather than otherwise: beyond the SPP, the alliance now comprises of two real non-entities in the SJP and PKMS, whose notable feature has been their dormancy with periods of abberration during elections (and who wouldn’t hazard a candid guess that the PKMS is meant to supply the token Malay candidate in GRCs, other than having its Changi Road building serve as a meeting place.) For all the talk of the NSP being without any credible public personality, the SDA will suffer the same fate once Mr Chiam leaves the scene: the SDA is without any viable successor post-Chiam, and the lack of urgency in grooming one is troubling - at the very least, the NSP breaking away suggests its intention to prime its own recognizable figures. This however does not render quitting the alliance a viable move in itself; the NSP needs to be judicious and sufficiently exploit the opportunity presented by the breakaway. For all the bluster, if the NSP does not aggressively develop and promulgate its identity, platform and leaders, the possibility of being marginalized and sinking away from the mainstream as warned becomes very real. Hence, whether the NSP could regard this defection as a truly momentous occasion lies in how it capitalizes on the latitude that is provided after the shackles of intra-coalition politics is removed, although it will be interesting to find any distinguishing and profound difference in policy principles relative to the Worker’s Party and SDA, since all the centrist parties in Singapore seem to muddle along with the issue of the day (along with the standard of being a check to the government), with the notable exception of the SDP with their obsessive advocacy of human rights and the ilk. Goes without saying, if the NSP broke away to pursue a much radical and left-socialist outlook to rival SDP (minus the angst maybe), that would liven up the political scene - and garner them the attention to leave a very indelible impression upon the public. Unlikely though. While the result of this flurry (and whether the NSP was correct to quit) will reveal itself in the not-so-distant future, Chiam and SDA faces a far greater challenge - renewal and staying relevant to avoid fading into the very same obscurity that it is warning the NSP of. Chiam is 71, and even the most ardent supporter must concede that serving for two more terms till he’s 81 is already stretching things - he should quit while being in his prime, not serving till the last moment possible (and that goes for a Minister Mentor as well) for the simple reason that his experience and age will become imposing to and crowd away the younger generation (which again, goes for a Minister Mentor too.) It is not about disregarding his former contributions, but rather allowing a new generation of political opposition leaders to rise to his mantle and develop a new legacy - Chiam already has his, and it should only be fair for him to relinquish the duty to someone much younger. Although this does not make it necessary for him to instanteneously fade away from politics, for he could still serve as an elder opposition figure dispensing regular dosages of counsel and advice. Hence, if the loss of NSP does not compel more urgency in him to pursue renewal aggressively - not only in terms of leadership, but party-wide since neither the SDA nor SPP is known for attracting the P65 generation, the SDA’s star is about to lose its shine. At present circumstances, it probably make sense for the SPP to acquire the SJP and PKMS, although its improbable that the PKMS would forsake its illustrious pre-independence history (since that’s all it has to mention about.) The dissolution of SDA as an alliance make sense since it is hard to discern any obvious advantage of having a formal alliance with two lightweight parties - informal cooperation will probably deliver the same results, if not better. The political scene will inevitably mature with due time, although the underlying looming issue will be the course of future development: between coalition consolidation into a mega-entity to challenge the PAP monolith, or small but numerous credible alternatives with slight differences in political orientation and possessing specific geographical enclaves as present: WP in the north-east region, SDA taking the south-east, SDP in the west while the NSP possibly taking up the northern constituencies. The former plays to the romantic notion of a united opposition front that captivates the psyche of every Singaporean who views intra-opposition disputes with disdain, and probably present the most viable strategy to dislodge the PAP from power. However, the primary objective of most opposition parties essentially remains to serve as a check in Parliament - even the Workers’ Party, arguably the most prominent, does not have its sights yet to claim Parliament. Therefore, it would seem more prudent to allow relatively small parties to develop since most parties do not have adequate resources to commit to a parliamentary takeover, much less the experience of running a town council. Instanteneous consolidation into an opposition alliance may seem to be enticing with its sheer promise at first impression, but the SDA experience points out the possible shortcomings of component party feudings. Consolidation through natural progression - yielded either by acquisitions or full integrations between parties as they seek to expand and grow - would prove to be more substantive than the relatively flimsy party alliances. To challenge the PAP for control of Parliament, it is undoubtedly necessary to require a huge party with an elaborate machinery of grassroots network. However, consolidating all parties into an SDA-esque alliance to provide the deceptive impression of size will not work; for a true party to develop enough clout to rival the PAP, time is needed - with all the nitty-gritty groundwork of establishing grassroots presence. This would render it more worthwhile to allow the smallish parties to grow and prosper on their own accord, and allow contemporary political realities to cajole and nudge the consolidation process - rather than having a grand alliance that reeks of superficiality and is fundamentally weak beyond grandiose pronouncements. NSP leaves Chiam’s 4-party alliance, The Straits Times Jan 19, 2007 A LEADING opposition party in the Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) headed by Mr Chiam See Tong is quitting the group. The National Solidarity Party (NSP) is leaving the four-party grouping because it wants ‘more space to develop’, said its president Sebastian Teo. He insisted it was not Mr Chiam’s leadership that drove the party away. ‘The point is that we have to stand on our own feet,” Mr Teo told reporters after a three-hour meeting with 11 of his party leaders. In a statement released after the meeting, the party said the majority had voted for an ‘amicable parting’ from the six-year-old alliance, which was formed in 2001 for opposition parties to contest the general election as a united force. Mr Chiam, who is chairman of the SDA and MP for Potong Pasir, could not be reached for comment. Besides the NSP, the SDA is made up of Mr Chiam’s Singapore People’s Party (SPP), Singapore Justice Party (SJP) and Singapore Malay National Organisation (PKMS). At the last General Election, the NSP, formed in 1987, fielded 12 out of the 20 SDA candidates. Yesterday, the NSP statement also dismissed talk that its departure was prompted by Mr Chiam’s poor leadership and ‘lethargy in the development of the opposition’. It was fulsome in its praise of Mr Chiam, calling him a tireless statesman who moulded the alliance into a respectable political force, and an exemplary beacon for the institution of democracy in Singapore. ‘The NSP has the utmost respect for the chairman of SDA,’ it added. The statement also said that by being on its own, the party will have more room to ‘manoeuvre, re-engineer and rebuild’ for growth. It said that it was less efficient to be in the alliance, noting that ‘a big grouping like the SDA, which comprises members with different priorities, can produce complexities in coordination.” However, it declared that it will continue to work with the SDA in future activities. Talks of a split was discussed officially by SDA leaders on Tuesday. Mr Sin Kek Tong, chairman of SPP, said leaders of all the four parties were present. ‘We all tried to convince them (NSP) to stay on, but they were quite firm about parting ways,’ he said. ‘I believe it will be much harder for NSP to succeed on its own,” he added, noting that it lacked a brand name or a recognisable leader. But that had not deterred SPP member Elvin Ong from defecting to the NSP. Mr Ong contested in Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC in the May 6 General Election last year. NSP is also not without its problems. One of its council members, Mr Martin Lee, quit late last year to join the Workers’ Party. NSP, in its statement, said it intends to contest in every electoral ward in future elections ‘to offer voters credible alternatives to the incumbent PAP’. When asked whether the party is concerned that it is now weaker without Mr Chiam, Mr Teo said: ‘Are you saying you need an MP to produce another MP? The point is we have to stand on our own feet.” sueann@sph.com.sg kenkwek@sph.com.sg Press Release - Re-positioning of the NSP Thu, Jan 18, 2007 A vote was conducted on the 18th January 2007 at the National Solidarity Party (NSP) party office to appraise the inclination of the party insofar as our continual membership in the Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) is concerned. This voting exercise constituted an important part of the continuous half-yearly internal periodic review of our party. The review process serves to improve our operational performance, strengthen the collective party resolve on crucial issues, and to focus the party on achieving its common goals. After an open-minded and objective process, the majority had opted for the position of an amicable parting from the SDA. The party took the view that the autonomy will harmonise our party’s aspiration to grow with our quest to explore new possibilities through wider latitude to manoeuvre, re-engineer, and rebuild the NSP. The respect for collectiveness within a big grouping like the SDA which comprises members with different priorities can produce complexities in coordination, leading to less than optimal operational efficiency. We hence seek to re-prioritise our position, from one of integral teamwork by virtue of the status of component member of SDA, to one of external strategic partnership with the SDA by collaborating on future activities. Contrary to the popular misguided speculation on Mr Chiam’s poor leadership and lethargy in the development of the Opposition, we would like to emphasise that the tireless statesman has performed a commendable feat of cementing the alliance over the years into a respectable political force which saw it underwent 2 successive General Elections with ever improving percentage of public support. Mr Chiam is also widely acknowledged as one of the most successful Opposition figures in Singapore, deserving inarguably a place in the history of our nation. The public accolades heaped upon Mr Chiam are a testimonial to his merited symbol as an exemplary beacon for the institution of Democracy in Singapore. The NSP has the utmost respect for the Chairman of SDA. Moving forward, the NSP will strive to contribute significantly to the overall objective of the Opposition to contest in every electoral ward, so as to offer voters credible alternatives to the incumbent PAP. We welcome the inclusion of anyone with moral standing and sincere passion for advancing the social, economic, and political demands of a maturing nation. Despite the cordial parting, the NSP is confident of future joint engagements with both SDA and Mr Chiam. We will continue to strengthen the bedrock of mutual trust and understanding between the Opposition parties so as to build a true society for all. Central Executive Council National Solidarity Party (emphasis theirs) POST-GE 2006: THE STATE OF THE OPPOSITION The PAP declaration that its 66.6% share of valid votes constituted a strong mandate seems pretty temerarious given the substantial decrease from its 2001 showing of 75%. While it is granted that the 2001 percentage is an aberration, it should be noted that there was a decline in the PAP’s majority in all constituencies bar two. Interestingly, if the voters-unfriendly SDP did not contest in this hustings, leaving Sembawang and Bukit Panjang uncontested, the PAP would poll a 64.4% - marginally lesser than that all-important 65% barrier. However, while the PAP did not exactly concede that its support has substantially eroded, it remains that the Opposition has only managed to recover the ground relinquinshed in the 2001 elections and not acquired any significant inroads. The 2006 percentage polled for the Opposition is almost on par with that of 1997, which is still a far cry from the 39% achieved during the 1991 halcyon days. Hence, while the Opposition can claim credit for re-establishing itself in the electoral scene, it would be presumptious to claim that their cause have been further advanced; this election has only allowed them to retrieve the political capital lost in 2001 and nothing more. However, this observation belies the sanguine outlook for the alternative parties, as 2006 threw up the Workers’ Party illustrious slate of professionals which promises to be a reckoning force. Their counterparts in SDA were similarly coherent and viable, although its exposure was limited by the battle royale between the PAP and WP. While Sembawang was largely perceived as the SDP’s last stand, the aftermath of the legal wrangle does actually offer unlikely promise for the future. A. WORKERS’ PARTY The Workers’ Party received noteworthy attention with its slate of credible candidates, a dramatic reversal of fortunes after the 2001 fiasco in which it only contested 2 constituencies (Nee Soon East and Hougang) as the candidates for Aljunied were disqualified. Its resurgence, masterminded by the crowd-pulling Low Thia Kang, lies within the transformation of the party’s image: the contemporary candidates are presented as being rational, moderated and polished, relative to the old WP with its flamboyant personalities whose oratorical ebullience and visceral passions held sway. 1. 2011 AND BEYOND The implication of this makeover is that the WP is playing on the PAP’s field by partially emulating the latter’s attention upon credentials and qualifications; however this should not be construed as a move towards the PAP’s elitist tendencies, but as an integral part of a holistic strategy. The PAP has managed to retain its hegemony in the past by conditioning the electorate to equate credibility with high stature and achievement - playing to the PAP’s ability to field candidates with impeccable academic records and illustrious careers. While the Opposition used to renege this arrangement and fielded non-starters (out of compulsion since they could not attract professionals and executives), the new WP has astutely subscribed to the game on its own terms. The Workers’ Party of 2006 was an inclusive party of intellectual heavyweights, professionals, businessmen and opposition veterans and non-stellar personas - bolstering its scholarly reputation while retaining its ties with the common man in the street. This holistic approach may provide the extra edge in the long-run over the PAP; with the WP able to match the intellectual prowess of the PAP, its advantage will lie in its ability to connect easily with the ground - which the PAP will be hardpressed to match with its elitist perception. Given its strong standing in 2006, it remains to be seen how the WP leverages upon this momentum in future. The James Gomez inquisition may have deterred the recruitment of potential members, but it does not dampen the prospect of the WP going from strength to strength. Sylvia Lim’s tantalizing promise that the WP “will be back” portends Aljunied and East Coast to be potential 2011 hotspots, barring another gerrymandering exercise. However, other than building upon its present strength, the immediate concern facing them would be the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament post. 2. NCMP AND MEDIA COVERAGE The NCMP scheme was initially derided by no less the old stalwart of WP, JB Jeyaratnam, although he and party colleague Lee Siew Choh did assume the posts when offered. Polling the best with a 43.9% in Aljunied, the WP slate was invited to fill in the NCMP post and to date, Sylvia Lim has been nominated. Reports indicate that only 8 members (out of 12) of the executive committee voted in favour of the arrangement. This harps upon the old but valid concern that the NCMP is a travesty to a proper functional democracy and that it serves to legitimizes the PAP’s soft authoritarian inclinations. While I would advocate that a Parliament should only be attended by elected representatives of the people, it would only be pragmatic to allow Sylvia Lim to ascend to the NCMP post to gain political mileage. Any idealism would be misplaced in an electoral system heavily skewed in favour of the PAP, so it would be a sheer waste to allow the NCMP offer to lapse. However, the public exposure an NCMP could tangibly garner does seem pretty limited. Steve Chia’s rigorous questioning in Parliament only receives token and cursory mention by the mainstream media, and translated into a 4% increase in votes. Hence, it could be argued that if the past five years were of any indication, the NCMP will not provide additional capital to the WP cause. However, I am cautiously optimistic of Sylvia Lim being able to exploit the NCMP post for two reasons: 1) the WP machinery and 2) the ever-growing prevalence of the internet and alternative media. While Steve Chia often acted as a solitary member, a concerted WP performance in Parliament would introduce a refreshing change in the dynamic of debates. And despite the media’s penchant for glossing coverage of opposition members, hope could be found in the form of the internet. While James Gomez had downplayed the role of the internet in disseminating information during one of the rallies, it is possble for the Opposition to break new ground in future as the internet grows to displace the mainstream media. Nonwithstanding the regulatory hassles, a central depository of news about the Opposition and their activities would serve to balance the partial press. A dedicated coverage of the Parliamentary joustings of Sylvia Lim and Low Thia Kang (and possibly, Chiam See Tong) in digestable formats (since the Hansard is tedious to seive through) would certainly raise the profile of the WP to an audience clamouring for more news beyond the Straits Times. B. SINGAPORE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE The coalition of four parties: the Singapore People’s Party (led by Chiam See Tong), the National Solidarity Party (Steve Chia), the Singapore Justice Party and the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura - formed in 2001, and fielded 20 candidates. While the slate was not exactly “riff-raff,” they lacked the shine of the glamour boys from WP - which serves to marginalize their already-menial campaign coverage in the media. Other than the erstwhile Chiam See Tong and Steve Chia, the only other candidate to make an indelible impact was Edmund Ng - although his skirmish with Mah Bow Tan over the cost of building HDB flats received scant attention in the light of the James Gomez witchhunt. 1. BEYOND CHIAM AND POTONG PASIR Prior to the hustings, the SDA was not considered as a party posing a significant threat to the PAP; indeed, it was generally perceived to be on the defensive. Chiam See Tong was occupied with repelling the PAP’s cavalry assault upon his constituency, and the general sentiment in the air was that his term as MP would soon draw to a close. Chua Chu Kang was seen as an outside chance for Steve Chia, although nobody expected a victory without a miracle of sorts. He attempted to push the contest to the wire - exposing the unsavoury details of his life in his book, placing his political involvement on the stake and releasing his phone number for residents to reach him. Hence, it was a considerable surprise when Chiam retained 55% (a 3% increase over 2001) while Steve Chia only managed a 4% increase. Chiam was then left the only stalwart of the SDA in Parliament, as Steve Chia proved his intent by withdrawing from politics for the forseeable future (although its a non-matter for the NCMP post, he was the second-best loser after WP’s Aljunied slate.) Steve Chia gone leaves the SDA with a 71-year old anchor in dire need of a successor. With the rest of the SDA slate are relatively lacklustre to fill in his footsteps, it is paramount for him to find a worthwhile candidate and introduce him early to the Potong Pasir community to ensure that the constituency remains under SDA control in future. The next five years could turn out to be his last term; a renewal has never been so much more exigent than before. The circumstances could possibly cajole him to pursue the integration of the SDA into the WP fold, a development which would play to the popular clamour for a united opposition front. As unlikely as it may seem now, the SDA does seem to be devoid of much option: most professionals and potential members would be attracted to the up-and-coming WP and the absence of Steve Chia entails the loss of a candidate who possessed the quixotic mix of youth and experience. SINGAPORE DEMOCRATIC PARTY Generally perceived as the weakest Opposition party, the SDP is helmed by the indefatigable Chee Soon Juan who champions for human rights and political reforms. Its glory days under Chiam See Tong remain a distant past in the face of the potentially-paralyzing legal suits filed by Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong. However, what precipitated its downfall was the relentless media-sponsored vilification which drew away attention from the substantial content that the SDP provided; the issues they raised were relevant and poignant, the antagonistic approach only served to undermine its efforts. Also, its platform is only appreciated by a marginal segment of the electorate given the focus on bread-and-butter issues. The classic Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is in operation: Singaporeans are still fixated upon the basic, lowe-end needs of material wealth and monetary security, and have yet to ascend to the higher-level intellectual needs of free expression, free assembly and the likes. This renders the SDP a party incapable of elected office, and it seems doomed to life outside Parliament. 1. CIVIL ACTIVISM Chee Soon Juan has steered the party to a path of civil activism, which again reveals flawed execution. Chee is essentially a political idealist, an incongruous responsibility to that of a politician. His idealism may come into conflict with political pragmatism which would severely hamper his electoral chances - he will always be perceived as being too radical and too much of a maverick figure to be entrusted with a Parliamentary seat, while his efforts as a civil activist will be construed as mere politicking. Therefore, the possible dissolution of the SDP could actually allow Dr Chee to forge ahead with his civil activism initiatives without any concern for electoral politics - providing him greater leeway to agitate for change and reform. Although his confrontational approach may discomfit some, it will be a matter of time before more radical figures and those sympathetic to their cause enter the fray - ditto for Yap Keng Ho and lawyer M Ravi. Although the termination of the SDP will be a tragic conclusion for a party of illustrious history, Dr Chee could be more suitably deployed in civil society, either in a think-tank or a reform movement. The remaining issue would then revolve around the responsibility of the western constituencies - the traditional poaching ground of the SDP. However, given the limited resources of the other two opposition parties, it seems unlikely that they will venture into Jurong, West Coast, Hong Kah and Holland-Bukit Timah. This could prove detrimental for the Opposition, as the earliest these constituencies would receive attention would be after 2011, provided a credible showing in the northeastern constituencies does materialize. Therefore, the 2006 elections has returned the political balance to the 1997 equilibrium, and the onus is weighing upon the Opposition to garner further mileage in 2011. The post-65 youths have expressed deeper interest in politics, which steals the benefit of apathy away from the incumbent. The 2011 hustings will be of deeper consequences: Lee Kuan Yew could very well have moved out of the political scene, a new PAP election strategy should have been developed to replace the neutralized threat of withheld upgrading, the WP should have cranked up its party machinery and a new (and possibly more liberal) generation of youths will be inducted into the electoral population. Nothing more could promise such a tantalizing contest.